公司大股东控制影响企业盈余管理机制实证研究——来自中国大陆上市公司关联交易中介效应检验的证据

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中央财经大学学报 ›› 2025, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (5) : 140-160.

吴国鼎, 李怡潇

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An Empirical Study on the Influence of Major Shareholders' Control on Enterprise Earnings Management Mechanism: Evidence from the Mediation Effect Test of Related-party Transactions of Listed Companies in Mainland China

WU Guoding, LI Yixiao

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摘要

大股东控制影响企业盈余管理机制中关联交易是一个重要渠道。笔者根据委托代理理论以及信息不对称理论,以2004—2022年中国大陆A股上市公司为研究样本的有效数据,运用中介效应检验方法,从样本总体以及区分企业所有制类型、企业内外部治理环境等维度,实证检验了关联交易在大股东控制影响盈余管理关系中的中介作用及其异质性。检验结果证实:大股东控制水平与盈余管理正相关;大股东控制水平的提高通过增加关联交易进而导致了盈余管理的增加,因而关联交易在其中具有中介效应。大股东控制通过关联交易影响盈余管理的机制在不同所有制类型、不同内部治理水平以及不同外部治理环境中均具有异质性。本研究将关联交易引入对大股东控制影响企业盈余管理机理的探讨,通过实证检验揭示大股东控制与盈余管理二者之间内在关联的运行方式,拓展了企业代理理论以及财务管理理论。研究结论有助于为提高公司治理水平以及规范中国资本市场中企业的关联交易和盈余管理行为提供理论依据。

Abstract

Related-party transactions serve as a significant channel through which controlling shareholders influence corporate earnings management mechanisms.Based on principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this study examines Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2022 as research samples.Using the mediation effect testing method, we empirically investigate the mediating role of related-party transactions in the relationship between controlling shareholders' control and earnings management, along with its heterogeneity across different ownership types, internal governance levels, and external governance environments.The findings confirm that: The control level of major shareholders is positively correlated with earnings management; Increased control by major shareholders elevates earnings management through expanded related-party transactions, demonstrating the mediation effect of such transactions; The mechanism through which controlling shareholders affect earnings management via related-party transactions exhibits heterogeneity across different ownership types, internal governance levels, and external governance environments.This research introduces related-party transactions into the analysis of how controlling shareholders influence corporate earnings management mechanisms, empirically revealing the operational pathways between controlling shareholders' control and earnings management, thereby expanding corporate agency theory and financial management theory.The conclusions provide theoretical foundations for enhancing corporate governance and regulating related-party transactions and earnings management practices in China's capital markets.

导出引用

吴国鼎, 李怡潇. 公司大股东控制影响企业盈余管理机制实证研究——来自中国大陆上市公司关联交易中介效应检验的证据[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2025, 0(5): 140-160

WU Guoding, LI Yixiao. An Empirical Study on the Influence of Major Shareholders' Control on Enterprise Earnings Management Mechanism: Evidence from the Mediation Effect Test of Related-party Transactions of Listed Companies in Mainland China[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2025, 0(5): 140-160

中图分类号： F276.6 F832.3

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