研发操纵、创新能力削弱与债券融资成本

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中央财经大学学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7) : 44-56.

金融保险

研发操纵、创新能力削弱与债券融资成本

石晓军, 赵鹤森

作者信息 +

R&D Manipulation, Innovation Capability Eroding and the Cost of Bond Financing

SHI Xiao-jun, ZHAO He-sen

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

本文利用中国2010—2020年发行中长期信用债的上市公司数据,考察了真实盈余管理中研发操纵对债券融资成本的影响,填补了研发操纵的债券市场反应研究的空缺。证据表明,在中国债券市场上,公司研发操纵会显著提高债券融资成本,且这种影响具有持续性,也会拉低债券信用评级。机制检验的证据表明,研发操纵主要是通过弱化公司创新能力的渠道影响债券融资成本;市场关注渠道没有得到实证支持。

Abstract

Based on the data of listed companies issuing medium- and long-term credit bonds in China from 2010 to 2020, this paper investigates the impact of R&D manipulation on bond financing cost.We find there is a significant effect of R&D manipulation and the cost of bond financing, and the R&D manipulation will increase the cost of bond financing and bring down the credit rating of the bond.We also find that R&D manipulation affects the bond financing cost mainly through the channel of weakening the company's innovation ability.Nevertheless, market attention have no significant effect on the relationship between R&D manipulation and the bond financing cost.This paper fills the gap in the research on the bond market reaction of R&D manipulation in real earnings management.

导出引用

石晓军, 赵鹤森. 研发操纵、创新能力削弱与债券融资成本[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2023, 0(7): 44-56

SHI Xiao-jun, ZHAO He-sen. R&D Manipulation, Innovation Capability Eroding and the Cost of Bond Financing[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 0(7): 44-56

中图分类号： F832.5F275.5

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