会计稳健性、管理层防御与真实盈余管理

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中央财经大学学报 ›› 2019, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (6) : 58-70.

财务与会计

会计稳健性、管理层防御与真实盈余管理

蒋勇, 王晓亮

作者信息 +

Accounting Conservatism,Management Entrenchment and Real Earnings Management

JIANG Yong, WANG Xiao-liang

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

随着公司治理理论与实践的发展,经理固守职位所衍生的管理者防御问题引起更多学者关注。本文从真实盈余管理的角度审视管理层的防御动机,以2008—2015年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,实证分析管理层防御对真实盈余管理的影响以及会计稳健性的调节作用,研究发现:管理层防御与真实盈余管理正相关;会计稳健性与真实盈余管理负相关;会计稳健性削弱了管理层防御与真实盈余管理的正向关系。这一发现有助于加强证券监管部门、中介机构以及投资者对盈余管理行为的认识,深化对盈余管理行为的理解,以便于加强公司治理,完善投资者保护制度。

Abstract

With the development of corporate governance theory and practice,the managers' defensive problem derived from the managers' position holding attracts more scholars' attention.This paper examines the defensive motives of management from the perspective of real earnings management,taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges from 2008 to 2015 as the research sample,and empirically analyzes the influence of management defense on real earnings management and the moderating role of accoun-ting conservatism.It is found that management defense is positively correlated with real earnings management.Accounting conservatism is negatively related to real earnings management.Accounting conservatism weakens the positive relationship between management defense and real earnings management.This discovery will help the securities regulatory section,intermediaries and investors deepen understanding the behavior of earnings management in order to strengthen corporate governance and improve investor protection system.

导出引用

蒋勇, 王晓亮. 会计稳健性、管理层防御与真实盈余管理[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2019, 0(6): 58-70

JIANG Yong, WANG Xiao-liang. Accounting Conservatism,Management Entrenchment and Real Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 0(6): 58-70

中图分类号： F271.5

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基金

国家社会科学基金项目“我国制造业转型升级与劳动力成本上涨的耦合研究”(项目编号:16BGL098);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目“投资者关注与定向增发定价效率:行为机理及其经济后果”(项目编号:18YJA630112);山西省“1331工程”重点创新团队建设计划(晋教科[2017]12号);济南大学博士基金项目“基于股权稳定的公司治理问题研究”(项目编号:B1804)。