政府经济干预、公司管理层过度投资与公司业绩——一个有调节的中介效应模型

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中央财经大学学报 ›› 2016, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (9) : 73-82.

财务会计

政府经济干预、公司管理层过度投资与公司业绩——一个有调节的中介效应模型

史青春, 妥筱楠

作者信息 +

Empirical Research on Government Economic Intervention, Overinvestment and Performance of Company: A Moderated Mediator Model

SHI Qing-chun, TUO Xiao-nan

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文章历史 +

摘要

笔者基于一个有调节的中介效应模型研究了政府经济干预、上市公司管理层过度投资及公司业绩之间的关系,通过建立计量模型依次进行假设检验。研究表明,政府经济干预与公司的过度投资显著正相关;政府经济干预与公司业绩显著负相关,并且受到过度投资的部分中介作用;同时,公司控股性质在其中介作用中具有调节效应,即相比于非国有控股公司,政府经济干预对国有控股公司的过度投资影响更大,因而对其公司业绩的影响也更大。笔者的研究结果有助于更好地认识政府经济干预对微观经济主体的投资和经营状况造成的后果,从而为政府监管部门制定经济发展对策提供一定的参考,以促进我国经济在转轨时期的健康有序发展。

Abstract

Based on a moderated mediator model,this article examines the relationship between government economic intervention,overinvestment and performance of listed company; an empirical research is made by establishing models,which are tested by regression.It shows that government economic intervention has a significant positive effect on overinvestment of listed company,while government economic intervention has a significant negative effect on performance of listed company and this relationship between them is partially mediated by overinvestment of listed company,at the same time, the listed company's ownership property moderates this mediator effect,that is,compared to that of non-state-owned holding company,government economic intervention has a greater effect on overinvestment of state-owned holding company,which leads to a worse effect on its performance.These conclusions can help to have a better understanding of the consequence caused by government economic intervention,and we make some suggestions to government for how to make economic plans to develop macroeconomics.

导出引用

史青春, 妥筱楠. 政府经济干预、公司管理层过度投资与公司业绩——一个有调节的中介效应模型[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2016, 0(9): 73-82

SHI Qing-chun, TUO Xiao-nan. Empirical Research on Government Economic Intervention, Overinvestment and Performance of Company: A Moderated Mediator Model[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2016, 0(9): 73-82

中图分类号： F276

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