笔者通过构建包含家庭、企业和政府的动态随机一般均衡模型,从福利的角度探讨贷款价值比效应及其与货币政策的最优配合策略。研究结果表明:在技术和房屋需求冲击下,引入贷款价值比有助于维护金融和经济的稳定;在技术冲击下,加入贷款价值比能起到“锦上添花”的效应,在房屋需求冲击下,贷款价值比效应更明显,贷款价值比与货币政策相辅相成;同时,贷款价值比是福利增进的;为实现社会福利最大化,贷款价值比与货币政策的最优配合策略是货币政策维护物价稳定,贷款价值比维护金融稳定。基于此,笔者提出将贷款价值比作为新常态下宏观审慎政策的主要工具之一,并不断完善贷款价值比的政策规则,把握好调控的时机和频率,以及成立政策协调配合委员会等建议,以确保贷款价值比与货币政策的有效配合。
Abstract
This paper constructs a DSGE model that contains the family,enterprise,government,and discusses the effect of LTV and the cooperation strategy between LTV and monetary policy from the perspective of the welfare.The results show that:under the technology shock and housing demand shock,the introduction of LTV helps to maintain financial and economic stability;under supply shocks,the macro-prudent policy can play the effect of “icing on the cake”,while under demand shocks,the effect of LTV is more obvious,LTV and monetary policy are complementary to each other;while LTV is welfare enhancing;to achieve social welfare maximization,the optimal cooperation strategy between LTV and monetary policy is that monetary policy is to maintain price stability,and LTV is to maintain financial stability.Based on this,we propose that government should take LTV as one of the main tools of macro-prudential policies under the new normal,constantly improve the policy rule,find the proper time for regulation,and establish a policy coordination commission to ensure effective coordination between LTV and monetary policy.
关键词
贷款价值比 /
货币政策 /
动态随机一般均衡模型
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Key words
LTV /
Monetary policy /
DSGE mode
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中图分类号：
F832
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脚注
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基金
国家社会科学基金项目“双重二元结构约束下的西部农村金融制度研究”(项目编号:09BJY098)。
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