摘要
在分析劳动合同的可执行性与自我执行性、劳动合同条款须具备可检验性(明确期与工资)和劳动强度与劳动范围模糊化等特征基础上,本文进一步运用行为经济学损失规避等理论来阐释劳动合同中这些特征,劳动合同可执行性与自我执行性是双方损失规避的基础要求、劳动合同条款可检验性是实现损失规避的基本条件、劳动强度与劳动范围的模糊性也是雇佣双方损失规避的必要制度安排和雇佣双方退出权不对称性合同制度安排是雇佣双方实现损失规避不可或缺的保障。
Abstract
by analyzing the enforceability, self- enforceability and verifiability of labor contracts and the vague characteristics of labor intensity and labor scope, the paper applies the behavioral economic theory of loss aversion to explaining the above labor contract characteristics. It is found that labor contract enforceability, self- enforceability are fundamental requirements for loss aversion in labor contract and labor contract verifiability is prerequisite in realizing loss aversion. Moreover, the vague characteristics of labor intensity and labor scope are necessary institutional arrangement for employment loss aversion and the asymmetric exit right arrangement of labor contract between the two employment sides are an essential guarantee for realizing loss aversion.
关键词
可执行性 /
损失规避 /
隐藏信息 /
隐藏行为
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Key words
enforceability /
loss aversion /
hidden information /
hidden behavior
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严维石.
劳动合同特征及其行为经济学研究[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2011, 0(02): 0-0
Yan Weishi.
Labor Contract Characteristics And Its Behavioral Economic Study[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2011, 0(02): 0-0
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