Does Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Promote Managers to Protect the Interests of Creditors? Empirical Evidence from Restrictive Bond Covenants

JIA Ying-dan, ZHANG Hui-zhi, LIN Wan-fa

Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (12) : 87-100.

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Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (12) : 87-100.

Does Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Promote Managers to Protect the Interests of Creditors? Empirical Evidence from Restrictive Bond Covenants

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{{article.zuoZheEn_L}}. {{article.title_en}}[J]. {{journal.qiKanMingCheng_EN}}, 2023, 0(12): 87-100

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