Local Political Turnover, Policy Uncertainty, and Residential Land Leasing Prices

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Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (10) : 111-128.

YANG Chao, LI Shao-xun, SUN Cong, LING Ai-fan

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Abstract

Land finance has attracted much attention due to its excessive reliance on land sales, which is also an important reason for pushing up housing prices.The political turnover may have an impact on the land transactions.Based on micro data of residential land transactions and local officials' turnover from 2008 to 2016 in China, this paper studies impact of political turnover on the residential land price.We find that the turnovers of mayor and secretary decrease the residential land price.Further analysis show that the transfers of officials to other cities, irregular turnovers and outgoing officials with longer tenure have greater negative impact on residential land prices, but the marketization can weaken the negative impact.We also find that the land price will increase after the new officials take office, and the positive effect are more significant under greater economic growth pressure.The results show that the political turnover has a significant impact on the residential land market, which provides a new perspective to understand our land market.

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Political turnover / Policy uncertainty / Land price

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YANG Chao, LI Shao-xun, SUN Cong, LING Ai-fan. Local Political Turnover, Policy Uncertainty, and Residential Land Leasing Prices[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 0(10): 111-128

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