With the increase in penetration and ownership of new energy vehicles,the problem has gradually emerged in the imbalance of the new energy vehicle market and inadequate technological development.The existence of problems,such as lack of charging infrastructure,weak innovation degree of core technology,range and fast charging time can not be guaranteed,become a stumbling block to the further development of new energy vehicles.In order to ensure the healthy development of the new energy market,the government constantly adjusts its policies and measures to vigorously develop the new energy vehicle industry,accelerate industrial upgrading,technological update,breaks free of existing bottlenecks,and optimizes the subsidy model.This article analyzes government subsidies,enterprise production,and consumer purchase strategies by constructing a three-party evolutionary game model.Under different subsidies and supervision methods,reveal the evolution process of enterprise production and consumer purchase strategy selection behavior,and analyze the evolution process and results through simulation.Under the collaborative supervision model between the government and consumers,the new energy vehicle manufacturers will actively improve the production technology.After the retreat of stimulating policies,the new energy automobile industry can continue to develop in an independent,independent and healthy direction.
Key words
Evolutionary game /
New energy vehicle /
Collaborative supervision
{{custom_keyword}} /
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
References
[1] 王安建,高芯蕊.中国能源与重要矿产资源需求展望[J].中国科学院院刊,2020(3):338-344.
[2] Wang X J,Song Y M,Zhang X,Liu H,M A,G L.Optimization of Subsidy Policy for New Energy Automobile Industry in China Based on an Integrated Fuzzy-AHP-TOPSIS Methodology[J].Mathematical Problems in Engineering,2019,34(5):155-177.
[3] 王田,邓世名.以电动汽车供应链为依托的充电站建设模式研究[J].中国管理科学,2018(10):152-163.
[4] 程永伟,穆东.基于SD动态博弈的新能源汽车供应链补贴策略优化[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018(12):29-39.
[5] 高伟,胡潇月.不同市场结构下新能源汽车补贴政策对企业研发投入影响分析[J].工业技术经济,2019(12):127-136.
[6] 周燕,潘遥.财政补贴与税收减免——交易费用视角下的新能源汽车产业政策分析[J].管理世界,2019(10):133-149.
[7] 赵骅,郑吉川.不同新能源汽车补贴政策对市场稳定性的影响[J].中国管理科学,2019(9):47-55.
[8] 曹国华,杨俊杰.政府补贴激励下消费者对新能源汽车购买行为的演化博弈研究[J].经济问题探索,2016(10):1-9.
[9] 李国栋,罗瑞琦,谷永芬.政府推广政策与新能源汽车需求:来自上海的证据[J].中国工业经济,2019(4):42-61.
[10] 熊勇清,李小龙.新能源汽车产业供需双侧政策对潜在消费者的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018(6):52-62.
[11] Li J Z.Charging Chinese Future:The Roadmap of China's Policy for New Energy Automotive Industry[J].International Journal of Hydrogen Energy,2020,45(20):11409-11423.
[12] Zhang H,Cai G X.Subsidy Strategy on New-energy Vehicle Based on Incomplete Information:A Case in China[J].Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,2020,30(12):541-563.
[13] Jin S T.An Analysis of the Influence of New Guidelines for Government Subsidies on China's New Energy Automobile Industry—A Case Study of BYD[J].IOP Conference Series:Earth and Environmental Science,2019,252(5):304-316.
[14] He M,Zhou J S,Liu L.A Study of Supporting Legal Policies for Improving China's New Energy Automobile Industry Based on Environmental Benefits Equilibrium-enlightenment from the Environmental Subsidies of Germany Legal System[J].International Journal of Hydrogen Energy,2017,42(29):18699-18708.
[15] 姜彩楼,张莹,李玮玮,吴崇.政府补贴与新能源汽车企业研发的演化博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2020(11):22-28.
[16] 曹霞,邢泽宇,张路蓬.基于政府驱动的新能源汽车产业合作创新演化博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,(6):21-30.
[17] Zhu X X,Ren M L,Wu G D,Pei J,Pardalos P M.Promoting New Energy Vehicles Consumption:The Effect of Implementing Carbon Regulation on Automobile Industry in China[J].Computers & Industrial Engineering,2019,33(6):211-226.
[18] 张国兴,张绪涛,程素杰,柴国荣,王龙龙.节能减排补贴政策下的企业与政府信号博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2013(4):129-136.
[19] 王文宾,赵学娟,张鹏,陆真晔,程明宝.双重信息不对称下闭环供应链的激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016(10):69-77.
{{custom_fnGroup.title_en}}
Footnotes
{{custom_fn.content}}
PDF(1376 KB)
