Based on the microcosmic aspect of enterprise, this paper constructs a multi-player oligopoly model this examines the mechanism of how intellectual property rights(IPR)protection influences the technology innovation.We find that in the beginning, IPR does promote technology innovation, but later it can inhibit innovation as well. Besides, the influence is closely related to the industrial characteristics. Not only is there an optimal level of IPR protection which is related to the main innovative motivation of the industry -“monopoly-driven”or“competition-driven”,and compared to the“competition-driven”industry, the optimal level of IPR protection of“monopoly-driven”industry is higher, but also the number of factories in the market as well as the ability to implement those innovations does influence the managers in their decisions about conducting the researches in question. In addition, we gathered the data of 106 listed companies specializing in high-tech industries from 2008 to 2014 and constructed a DEA-Malmquist model based to examine whether intellectual property right protection promote technology innovation. The empirical results strengthened our theoretical analysis, concluding that proper IPR, the upgrading of enterprise technologies and the management level of scientific research do influence the technology innovations in Chinese industries. Most importantly, the results have both theoretical significance and practical value for Chinese IPR reform.
Key words
Intellectual property rights protection /
Technology innovation /
High-tech industries /
Multi-player oligopoly model /
DEA-Malmquist model
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