From the Complete Contract Theory to the Incomplete Contract Theory: A Review of Nobel Prize for Economics in 2016

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Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics ›› 2016, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (12) : 129-135.

NIE Hui-hua, RUAN Rui, LI Chen

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NIE Hui-hua, RUAN Rui, LI Chen. From the Complete Contract Theory to the Incomplete Contract Theory: A Review of Nobel Prize for Economics in 2016[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2016, 0(12): 129-135

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